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How does a transitional constitutionalism challenge the 
constitutional canon? My recent book, Transitional Justice (Ox-
ford University Press, 2000), discusses constitutional theory in 
periods of radical political upheaval, and offers a transitional 
perspective on the American constitution. Here I merely high-
light some ways that incorporating a transitional constitutional-
ism might challenge, as well as supplement, the dominant consti-
tutional canon. 
To begin, the very question of whether a transitional ac-
count ought to be brought to bear upon the canon illuminates its 
underlying assumptions about the place of constitutional law in 
our political scheme; that is, the extent to which the canon is 
constituted by and constituting of a distinctive normative consti-
tutional conception. In particular, I contend that the prevailing 
canon derives from an understanding of American constitution-
alism that is "foundational," and, by the same token, not transi-
tional. The established account implies a certain structure, and 
periodization, that define the Constitution's salient historical and 
political context, and that also generate a canonical constitu-
tional doctrine. Moreover, this foundational account privileges a 
particular conception of constitutional change. It is a normative 
account of the relation of constitutional law to political change 
that privileges the role of law over politics. In this idealized ac-
count, the canonical narrative is constituted by select caselaw 
that is said to construct constitutional transformation. To the ex-
tent that the dominant account seeks to relate to constitutional 
law a notion of steady state constitutionalism, it emphasizes an 
entrenched authoritative constitutional canon. A transitional 
perspective would challenge many of the dominant account's 
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conceptual assumptions, with a number of interpretive conse-
quences. A transitional account problematizes foundational con-
stitutionalism's assumptions by suggesting a less idealized and 
more complicated view of the relation between constitutional 
and political change. Reconfiguring this relationship implies 
complicating the canon. 
Consider the extent to which the narrative of American 
constitutionalism represented in most law school texts is predi-
cated upon a distinctive periodization, which one might consider 
a canonical history. Conceiving of the first stage as the "found-
ing" focuses scholarly attention on constitutionmaking and the 
constitutional convention and ratification processes. It also fo-
cuses scholarly understanding of our constitutional culture upon 
a circumscribed literature of the period, chiefly the writings of 
the "founders." So canonical is this account that this version of 
constitutional history has become virtually synonymous with 
American constitutionalism. 
Further, the canonical account is premised upon an under-
standing of constitutional change that emphasizes constitutional 
proceduralism over other more substantive recognition rules. 
This apparently autonomous view of constitutionmaking proc-
esses, and more generally of constitutional change, has conse-
quences for the prevailing approaches to constitutional interpre-
tation. The dominant view has shaped the scholarly debate of 
the last decade over the question of what are the applicable 
principles of constitutional interpretation. The content of the 
canonical doctrine to a large degree follows from this arch un-
derstanding of our constitutional origins. 
Reconceptualizing constitutional law's relationship to poli-
tics has consequences for the narrative of constitutional change 
and, therefore, for constitutional doctrine. Deploying a transi-
tional account would reconceptualize the canonical periodiza-
tion. For starters, it would temporize the account in a way that 
redirects our attention to more extensive periods of constitu-
tional transformation. It would shift the analysis from estab-
lished accounts of the processes of constitutional change to more 
gradual and less radical forms. Adding a transitional account 
would reconceive the critical periods and processes of constitu-
tional change, and, relatedly, the relevant constitutional doc-
trine.1 A transitional perspective offers alternative narratives of 
1. For references to the implications for the dominant constitutional account of 
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the Founding, Reconstruction and the New Deal with ramifica-
tions for canonical doctrine.2 
Deploying a transitional analysis would have further conse-
quences. To a large extent, the canon is predicated on a distinc-
tive understanding of an enduring constitution. Yet, from a 
transitional perspective, this understanding is too crude. A tran-
sitional perspective contemplates a more nuanced approach to 
constitutional interpretation, as it theorizes multiple constitu-
tional modalities. The notion of differentiation of constitutional 
modalities along a continuum of entrenchment contributes a 
more dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation. The 
proposed perspective of a constitution, which comprehends dif-
ferentiated modalities, offers added available interpretive prin-
ciples, with implications for rethinking the canonical doctrine. 
This account clarifies for example, how portions of the constitu-
tional text relate distinctly to particular transitional context and 
circumstances. A transitional account would allow, for example, 
understanding the extent to which the 1787 Constitution is in 
some part ratifying of existing constitutional consensus, and in 
other part constitutionally transformative. Adding a transitional 
perspective to the available interpretive approaches would allow 
a better understanding of the quintessentially American project 
of constitutional transformation. 
The proposed transitional evaluation would also enable a 
better understanding of the extent to which constitutional trans-
formational work is ongoing, with ramifications for applicable 
principles of constitutional interpretation. Ultimately, deploying 
a transitional analysis would help to expose the interpretive as-
sumptions underlying the canon, but also it may constitute a 
view of constitutionalism that is constructivist, and in the final 
analysis, anti-canonical. 
These thoughts are preliminary, as my book primarily fo-
cuses on the meaning of justice in transition, not on the Ameri-
can constitutional canon. Nevertheless, the constitutional com-
ponent of the project points to a research agenda, which should 
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be challenging of some of the meta-theoretical predicates of the 
prevailing constitutional canon. 
